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The Law of July, 7th 2016 on the Polish Constitutional Court (hereinafter to referred as “ the Law”) leaves no
doubts that the parliamentary majority lead by Law and Justice party (PiS) is not holding back and is determined
to see its plan through to make sure that Polish Constitutional Court (“the Court”) is finally tamed and
incapacitated. By way of a statute, the 1997 Constitution is picked to torn to pieces and its provisions short-cut at
every corner. The Law signals the death knell for the Court. The institution once recognized as powerful, efficient
and independent from whatever powers that be is left at the mercy of the politicians, and unable to effectively
wield its power of judicial review. Most importantly, the Law will make it impossible for the Court to provide an
effective check on the excesses of parliamentary majority.
When read in the light of the previous case law of the Court (in particular the judgments of: December, 3 rd, 2015
((case K 34/15)); December, 9th 2015 ((case K 35/15)) and March, 9th, 2016 ((case K 47/15)) and in the Opinion
of March, 11th, 2016 of the Venice Commission (no. 833/2015), the Law reintroduces the provisions that were
already either disqualified by the Court as unconstitutional, or criticized by the Venice Commission.
Reading the Law[1]. Constitutional Tragedy’s Final Act
It is clear that the PiS decided to engage in a tactic of waiting game, hoping that EU faced with Brexit will let this
time Poland off the hook. Many of the Law’s provisions are verbatim repetitions of the old Law that the Court had
struck out as unconstitutional in its judgment on March, 9th 2016. There is no doubt that PIS is neither interested
in implementing the opinion of the Venice Commission, nor following clear constitutional commands as
interpreted by the Court. The Law leaves the Court toothless and vulnerable to outside pressure. Its common
themes revolve around the increased role of the executive in the daily functioning of the Court, making the Court
a constitutional figure-head and rubber-stamp for the majority and undermining the Court’s ability to function
effectively. Attack on the Court has two dimensions: external and internal. External opens up the possibilities for
the executive to unconstitutionally interfere with the Court in a way that makes the Court dependent on outside
forces. Internal deals with these provisions that tie the Court’s hands from the inside and cripple its ability to act
in a timely and speedy fashion. What comes across most strongly is that independent and efficient Court ready
to uphold the Constitution against the ruling party is the last thing PiS wants.
Packing the Court. On the inside
The Law provides (art. 26((2)) the minimum number of judges to sit on Full Court. For the Court to sit as Full
Court, participation of at least 11 judges is always required. There is a danger thus, that requiring the minimum
number of judges will lead to the marginalization of the Full Court and inability to effectively convene it, where
necessary. Where, for objective reasons, the number of judges who are able to sit, is lower than the number
statutorily required for deciding as Full Court, the Court will never be able to sit as Full Court. As a result vast
powers reserved to the Full Court (art. 26 ((1)) of the Law) will remain on paper and will become devoid of any
practical significance[2].
In accordance with art. 38(3) of the Law , dates of hearings are to be set in the order in which cases are received
by the Court. This is classic example of pushing ahead by PiS with the provision that the Court has already ruled
to be unconstitutional. In this case it is inconsistent with art. 173 in conjunction with art. 10 of the Constitution as
interfering with the judiciary’s independence and its separateness from other branches of government: “the
determination of pace at which particular cases are considered – including the setting of the dates of hearings
and the dates of sittings in camera – is (…) inheres in the Court’s adjudicative function. The legislator’s task is to
create optimal conditions, and not to interfere in the process of adjudication by specifying the moment when the
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Court may consider a given case. (…) Indeed, the Court’s independence requires that it be guaranteed
discretion in adjudication, by excluding any impact of other authorities not only on the content of its rulings, but
also on the process of issuing them”. Also, in its Opinion of 11 March 2016, the Venice Commission noted that
“an obligation to hold a hearing and to decide in a strict chronological order risks not being in compliance with
European standards. There must be room for the Constitutional Court to continue and finish deliberations in
certain types of cases earlier than in others” (point 65 of the opinion).
Art. 43 of the Law  introduces important substantive limitation on the Court’s constitutional powers. It deviates
from the Court’s power of review as set forth in art. 188(1) – (3), art. 79(1), and art. 193 of the Constitution. Art.
43 specifies that the review will be limited to checking the content of the act and the procedure in which the act
was enacted. As such, it turns blind eye to the Court’s power to review whether an organ had a competence to
enact a normative act and declare an act unconstitutional as a result of the lack of competence. The review
powers of the Court are delimited constitutionally, not statutorily. It is another example of classic and favourite
method of PiS that was already on full display in previous cases decided by the Court in December 2015 and
March, 2016: overriding the Constitution by way of a statute. Since art. 188(1) – (3), art. 79(1), and art. 193 of
the Constitution comprise no competence restriction on the power of review of the Court, the legislator must not
introduce such restrictions via the statute. Should we accept this, the entire integrity of the constitutional
document would be seriously weakened and compromised. It would also open it up for endless statutory
corrections and bring to mind practice prevalent in the communist Poland whereby Constitution was mere
ornament, and the regime ruled by statutes. It would turn the hierarchy of the system and the supremacy of the
Constitution on its head.
The provisions of Article 68(3) – (5) of the Law  are a novelty and hide the essence of “Court-packing” plan. They
set out procedure allowing at least 4 judges of the Court to raise during the deliberation, an objection(s) related
to a proposed judgment, every time important “institutional issues or issues on the public order are at stake”.
Should this blocking minority materialize, the deliberations on a case is adjourned for at least three months (Art.
68(6)), and – should the blocking minority continue to uphold its objections – for further six months (Art. 68(7)).
Adjournment is fixed and cannot be shortened which ties the Court’s hands. Should judges of the blocking
minority be willing to compromise or meet with others judges before the lapse of the three-month period of time,
they will be debarred from doing so. Deliberations will be reopened only after the lapse of the three-month period.
The adverse affects of the blocking minority will not stop here, though, and might be extended to other cases as
well. Due to the obligation to set dates of hearings, for the consideration of applications lodged at the Court on
the basis of the order in which the applications are lodged (Art. 38 ((3)) of the Law), a delay would also occur in
the consideration of applications other than the one with regard to which the judges have raised objections. The
Court would have to first resolve the case in which the judges have raised objections, and only then it could
proceed to rule on other cases.
The judgments of December, 3rd , 2015 (K 34/15) and of March, 9 th, 2016 (K 47/15) laid down a clear principle
whereby “in the context of the Court’s systemic position and the unique nature of its competence, it is particularly
justified that proceedings before the Court should be effective and would result – within a reasonable period of
time – in issuing a final ruling, especially in cases that are of significance for the functioning of the organs of the
state as well as for the exercise of rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. This follows from the
principle of efficiency in the work of public institutions, which arises from the Preamble to the Constitution. (…)
Consequently, a statutory model of proceedings before the constitutional court needs, on the one hand, to take
account of the unique nature of the Court’s systemic function and, on the other, ensure efficiency in the exercise
of the Court’s powers” Furthermore, “the legislator may not lower the previous standard of diligence and
efficiency in the work of an existing public institution”. The procedure introduced in art. 68(3) – (5) will
undoubtedly affect the speediness with which the Court disposed of cases in which objections have been
submitted by the blocking minority and will push the Court to the brink of internal standstill[3].
Packing the Court. On the outside
Article 12(2) of the Law  envisions that in the case of the termination by a final decision of the General Assembly
of the Court of the mandate of a judge, the consent of the President of Poland is required. This raises serious
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constitutional reservations. It opens up the Court to an interference by an executive branch of the government.
The interference results in nullifying the legal effects of the ruling by refusing to implement the ruling. Making the
implementation of the Court’s disciplinary ruling contingent on the consent of the President not only impinges on
the independence of the judiciary (art. 173 of the Constitution) and violates the principle of the separation of, and
balance, between powers (art. 10 of the Constitution), but also contravenes the principle of the independence of
the judges of the Court (Art. 195(1) of the Constitution). The existence of separate judicial disciplinary
proceedings is one of the staples of the Court’s jurisprudence on the independence of the judiciary. Separate
disciplinary system of responsibility guarantees judicial independence. It should be recalled here that in case K
47/15 the Court left no doubt that entrusting the Sejm with the power to recall a judge of the Constitutional Court
from office by way of a special procedure upon the application by the President or the Minister of Justice,
infringes the Court’s independence, the separation of and balance between powers (Art. 10(1) of the
Constitution). The Court noted that “the Sejm, as an organ of the legislative branch of government, may affect
the organs of the judiciary, including the Constitutional Court, only in so far this does not violate the autonomy of
the judiciary, and primarily in situations set out in the Constitution (…). The role of the Sejm was restricted by the
constitution-maker to the election of judges of the Court. After the election of a judge of the Court, the Sejm
definitely loses its influence over the status of the said judge”. This dictum (accepted by the Venice Commission
in its opinion) must hold true a fortiori for any interference by the President. The latter has no constitutional
powers to interfere in the process of selecting constitutional judges. Should the termination of the term of office
be contingent on the consent of the President, this would infringe the principle of the Court’s independence,
separation of, and balance between. It would be tantamount to adding by statute to the President’s powers in
contravention of the Constitution. Hence, another example of “amending” the Constitution by a statute. The
interference by the executive extends beyond President, though. Art. 12 (2) of the Law  will also entail the power
on the part of the Prime Minister to affect the status of the judges of the Court. For an official act issued by the
President to grant his consent in accordance with art. 12 (2) to be valid would have to be signed by the Prime
Minister, thus bringing another non-judicial player in the mix. This is another example of a statute shortcutting the
Constitution: Prime Minister who has no constitutional powers to determine the composition of the Court, will
have its say in the implementation of the disciplinary rulings of the Court.
Serious constitutional reservations arise due to the proposed mechanism of selecting an unspecified number of
candidates for the positions of the President and Vice-President of the Court. Article 16(1) read together with
point 7 of the Law provides for “at least three” candidates elected “from among the judges of the Court who have
received the largest number of votes in a secret ballot” (Art. 16(1) and (2)). At the same time, the Law limits the
number of votes that a judge may cast to one vote (Art. 16(7)). Therefore, and as rightly pointed out in the
Analysis prepared by the Office of the Constitutional Court[4], this procedure does not rule out a situation in
which a judge receiving only one vote (e.g. because s/he votes for him/herself) will be considered as a candidate
for the position of the President or Vice-President of the Court. There are doubts though, whether a person
selected in this way may be regarded as a candidate of the General Assembly of the Judges of the Court within
the meaning of Article 194(2) of the Constitution. The latter provision requires that candidates for the positions of
the President and Vice-President of the Court be proposed by the General Assembly. As a result the Law may
“hijack” the competence (and the will) of the General Assembly to put forward candidates for the positions of the
President and Vice-President. Instead of selecting the person who received the strongest support of his/her
fellow judges, the President will be free to select anyone from the list submitted by the General Assembly. Again,
we have a situation of a statute superseding the Constitution.
As for temporal provisions, the Law contains regulation that clearly aims at full paralysis of the Court. Art. 84(1) of
the Law lays down the obligation to apply the Law to cases that were pending before the entry into force of the
Law. This is linked to the obligation imposed by the Law (see also above) to rule on the cases in order in which
applications are lodged at the Court (Art. 38(2)). The Analysis by the Office of the Constitutional Court stressed
that the requirement to apply the Law to all cases that were pending prior to the entry into force of the Law raises
doubts in the light of the principle of a democratic state ruled by law (Art. 2 of the Constitution), the principle of
diligence and efficiency in the work of public institutions (the Preamble to the Constitution), the principle of the
Court’s independence and its separateness from the other branches of government (Art. 173 of the Constitution),
as well as the principle of the separation of and balance between powers (Art. 10 of the Constitution)[5].
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Article 84(2) of the Law imposes on the Court the obligation to rule on the cases pending prior to the entry into
force of the Law, within one year from the date of entry into force of the Law[6]. Such a solution constitutes
interference with the Court’s freedom to conduct its own business and interferes with the procedural discretion of
the Court. The Analysis by the Office of the Constitutional Court makes a reference to the view expressed by the
Court whereby “the legislator’s task is to create optimal conditions, and not to interfere in the process of
adjudication by specifying the moment when the Court may consider a given case. (…) only in exceptional and
justified instances may the legislator specify the maximum time-limit for the consideration of a case by the Court
(…). Indeed, the Court’s independence requires that the Court be guaranteed discretion in adjudication, by
excluding any impact of other authorities not only on the content of its rulings, but also on the process of issuing
them”. There is a clear danger a backlog here. The side effect of art. 84(2) will be the Court’s inability to rule on
cases that are lodged at the Court after the entry into force of the Law, as the Court will understandably shift its
attention to all the cases already pending before the entry into force of the Law[7]. Constitutional complaints by
the citizens lodged after the entry into force of the Law will have to wait. This is the price to be paid for
successfully packing the Court.
Finally, two “jewels” in the crown of constitutional packing the Court. Art. 91 of the Law  deals with the publication
of the Court’s judgments issued between March, 10th 2016 and June, 30th, 2016 (the government has
persistently refused to publish judgments of the Court claiming that they were vitiated by the procedural errors
and lacked legal basis). The Law provides that the Court’s rulings “issued in breach of the provisions of the
Constitutional Court Act of 25 June 2015” between March, 10th, 2016 and June, 30th, 2016, are to be published
in a relevant official publication within 30 days from the date of entry into force of the Law. The above regulation
again raises constitutional concerns. According to art. 190(2) of the Constitution, rulings of the Constitutional
Court are to be immediately published in the official publication in which the original normative act was
promulgated. There is thus a strong constitutional argument to support the proposition that constitutional
concerns arise whenever any time-limit for immediate publication is set by statute [8]. This is, thus, another
provision of the new Law that clearly flies in the face of the rulings of the Court: the immediacy of publishing a
ruling of the Court in a relevant official publication requires immediate action, without undue delay[9].
Conspicuously absent from art. 91 of the Law is the question of the publication of the judgment of March, 9 th
2016 (case K 47/15). Venice Commission regarded the refusal to publish this judgment as contrary to the
principle of the rule of law. For the Commission such refusal constitutes an unprecedented move that would
further deepen the constitutional crisis. The publication of this judgment must be seen as a precondition for
finding a way out of this crisis. With the omission of this judgment from the new Law, ruling party showed its true
colors and intentions. So much for a constitutional compromise ![10]
What about the “midnight judges” elected by PiS in contravention of the Constitution and the Court’s judgment of
December 2015?
Art. 92 in conjunction with Article 6(7) of the Law  addresses the effects of the taking of the oath of office by a
judge of the Court and does so in a way that is as far from a constitutional settlement as possible. The judgment
of December, 3rd, 2015 (K 34/15) dispelled any doubts as to the constitutionality of the election of three judges
that were elected by the old Sejm. The Court clearly ruled that the President is obliged by the Constitution to
accept the oath of office from the three judges whose terms of office began on November, 7th, 2015. The
necessity to respect and implement the judgment of December, 3rd, 2015 (K 34/15) by the President was also
emphasized by the Venice Commission. Art. 92 of the Law may not eliminate the effects of the judgment of
December, 3rd 2015 (K 34/15) and yet to this very day three judges elected constitutionally by the old Sejm wait
to be sworn in by the President. Again, so much for a constitutional compromise …
All this matters in the long – term plan of PiS as art. 92 of the new Law deliberately leaves open a possibility that
three judges elected by the old Sejm (dominated by Civic Platform now in opposition), and never sworn in by the
President, will never be able to assume their judicial duties after all. Art. 92 will be used as an argument in favour
of giving the nod to the three judges elected by the new PiS – dominated Parliament in December 2015. These
judges were immediately sworn in by the President, despite the fact that the Court at the time (in December,
2015) and in the light of the judgment in SK 34/15 had no vacancies. In this way three judges elected
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constitutionally by the old Sejm and since then waiting in limbo to be sworn in by the President will be passed
over and PiS will finally get the coveted majority of the subservient judges. So much for a compromise …
Following the Orbán playbook
Analysis of the new Law proves that there is devilish logic behind PiS plan. It clearly brings to mind how V. Orbán
tamed the EU and followed through with his own plan to pack the Hungarian Constitutional Court (I owe
reconstruction of Orbán’s tactic to Professor Kim Scheppele). Orbán has introduced some changes in response
to external criticism and claimed that the problem has been fixed and everything was back to normal. He
entrenched the old system, while giving up on one or two of the most outrageous elements that he didn’t really
need anyway. This strategy would stop the external criticism long enough for the EU to get the translation, study
it and realize that they had been fooled again – but in the meantime, this would give more time for Orbán to
consolidate his power. And then it would all start again. After many rounds of this back-and-forth, the external
critics whittled away a few small elements of the system, but in exchange Orbán got to keep his illiberal and
autocratic constitutional reform. In short, nothing really happened as a result of outside criticism. And then in the
end, critics gave up and pretended that everything had been addressed.
Professor Scheppele’s incisive reconstruction of Orbán’s “wait – see – act ” strategy find its perfect application in
the case of Poland. The Law under consideration is persistent in reproducing unconstitutionality in the hope that
in the end the external outcry will subside and critics will tend to more pressing issues. The Law is enacted
under the guise of cynical assurances of good intents and sincere concerns allegedly to put things right and
bring the self-induced constitutional crisis to an end. Provisions most questionable and clearly unconstitutional
(e.g. requirement of a two-thirds majority at the Court) were dropped at the very last minute (see above). The
argument will go now that this dispels all constitutional doubts and that the Law is a result of good will of the
ruling party and a reasonable compromise. This in turn will shift the blame towards the opposition. It will be
pictured as a destructive, obstructive and anarchistic force, while the ruling party portrayed as playing the role of
a noble knight in a shining armor. In the end of this constitutional foul play, public opinion will be left with the
conviction that it is indeed so, and that there is nothing to worry about. The philosophy of the ruling party is this:
“let’s give it another try and hope nobody notices”. Indeed V. Orbán would be proud of his Polish constitutional
students.
Last, but not least. What about Poland and Europe now? Notwithstanding all PiS rhetoric to the contrary, Europe
must not be duped into believing that the Law signals a change of heart on the part of PiS. “Constitutional heart”
of PIS continues to be black, mischievous and bent on annihilating the Court. Constitutional review has no place
in the grand narrative of slogans built around total control, no-constraints and populist power to the people. It
would be extremely short-sighted now for EU to cut Poland a slack as a result of the BREXIT and relegate Polish
case to the margins of European politics. That would signal a weakness and confirm a total lack of a vision on
the part of European leaders. BREXIT was fueled by the same sentiments that now engulf Poland. Europe must
see things as they really are and not back down. Europe should not be fooled as to the real intentions of PIS:
packing the Court and doing away with all checks-and-balances and the rule of law. It is my way or the highway
and the Court must be taken over at all costs for years to come. Should Europe follow “business as usual” and
look the other way, July, 7th 2016 will go down in history as the day on which Polish Constitutional Court was
finally laid down to rest and shocking analogies with Belarus made. It is a paradox that one after the new Law
has been passed, President B. Obama spoke in Warsaw in defense of the Court, Polish democracy and the rule
of law. He said: “and as your friends and ally we’ve urged all parties to work together to sustain Poland’s
democratic institutions. That’s what makes us democracies, not just by the words written in constitutions or in
the fact that we vote in elections, but the institutions we depend on every day, such as rule of law, independent
judiciaries and a free press”. Unfortunately, at the time of his gentle admonition, one of the institutions – the
Constitutional Court – that made Poland a proud DEMOCRACY, was pushed into oblivion.
[1] I found extremely helpful, and acknowledge, the analysis and translation Notes on main legal problems
arising from the new Law on the Constitutional Court (Report of 24 June 2016 by the Sejm’s Extraordinary
Subcommittee for the consideration of Laws on the Constitutional Court) published on the website of the
Constitutional Court (available here). With few modifications and slight renumbering, the Law adopted on July,
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7th, 2016 reproduces the draft. The text below builds on this analysis and adds to it, where necessary.
[2] One should bear in mind here the Court’s dictum in its March Judgment (case K 47/15) that Full Court is
composed by all judges of the Court who have capacity to adjudicate on the day of issuing a ruling.
[3] Old art. 69(2) of the draft Law stipulated that in the event of judges’ objections to a draft of a judgment (art.
68(5) – (7) of the Law), a two-thirds majority vote was required for determining a ruling on unconstitutionality.
This was dropped and now art. 69 (1) simply provides that decisions of the Court require simple majority.
Dropping the requirement of two – thirds majority might be easily explained by the tactics of constitutional give-
and-take and cold calculus of gains-and-losses. It was clearly unconstitutional and contravened explicit wording
of Article 190(5) of the Constitution, and as such indefensible. Sometimes it makes a lot of sense to back down
on non-essentials in order to move forward with essentials on other fronts and PiS mastered this tactic to a
perfection. For this tactic see also below part “Following the Orban’s playbook”.
[4] See note 1 above.
[5] Let us not forget that the Court had already an opportunity to rule on such temporal regulation. In its judgment
of March, 9th, 2016, it declared the unconstitutionality of a similarly worded temporal settlement.
[6] For an exception to this obligation see art. 85 of the Law.
[7] Here again we have an example of “copy-paste” of a regulation that has already been ruled unconstitutional
by the Court (see judgment of March, 9th 2016, case K 47/15).
[8] The Analysis prepared by the Office of the Constitutional Court further points out that the provision of a 30-
day time-limit for the publication of rulings may erroneously suggest that the observance of the said time-limit
suffices to fulfill the constitutional obligation to immediately publish the Court’s rulings. In fact, the immediacy of
publication should be specified with regard to each ruling on a case-by-case basis.
[9] The judgment of December, 9 th, 2015, (case K 35/15).
[10] As argued in the Analysis of the Office of the Court, the wording “ issued in breach of the provisions of the
Constitutional Court Act of 25 June 2015” also raises serious reservations in the light of the Court’s
independence (Art. 173 of the Constitution) and the separation of and balance between powers (Art. 10 of the
Constitution). The Constitution does not entrust any public authority with competence to evaluate the accuracy of
the Court’s application of the provisions of the Constitutional Court Act in the process of adjudication.
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